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Abstract 
 
Traditional corporate governance patterns are based on the interaction 
among composite stakeholders and the various forms of separation 
between ownership and control. Shareholders, debtholders, managers, 
employees, suppliers, and clients cooperate around the Coasian firm 
represented by a nexus of increasingly complex contracts. These well-
known occurrences have been deeply investigated by growing literature 
and nurtured by composite empirical evidence. Apparently unrelated 
network theory is concerned with the study of graphs as a representation 
of (a)symmetric relations between discrete objects (nodes connected by 
links). Network theory is highly interdisciplinary, and its versatile 
nature is fully consistent with the complex interactions of (networked) 
stakeholders, even in terms of game theoretic patterns. The connection 
between traditional corporate governance issues and network theory 
properties is however still under-investigated. Hence the importance of 
an innovative reinterpretation that brings to “network governance”. 
Innovation may for instance, concern the principal-agent networked 
relationships and their conflicts of interest or the risk contagion and 
value drivers – three core governance issues. To the extent that network 
properties can be mathematically measured, governance issues may be 
quantified and traced with recursive patterns of expected occurrences. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Corporate governance issues and the interactions among composite 
stakeholders may well be represented and interpreted in graphical 
terms, connecting stakeholding nodes (vertices) with their interactions 
(links or edges). 
Even though both corporate governance and network science are well-
grounded theories, their possible connections have been hardly 
investigated and, to the author’s knowledge, there are no specific studies 
about their joint analysis. The research is so original and may ignite a 
new literature strand. 
Consistently with this framework, the research question of this 
study is concerned with the possibility to represent the interactions 
among stakeholders – a core corporate governance concern – through 
network patterns and properties.  
The expression “network governance” has already been used by 
Jones et al., 1997, referring to some interaction between transaction cost 
economics and social network theories. The perimeter of this study is, 
however, wider. 
To the extent that networks can be expressed in mathematical 
terms, through adjacency or incidence matrices, interactions among 
stakeholders may be measured, especially if they follow recursive 
patterns. 
The main corporate governance issues that can be interpreted using 
network theory may for instance, concern: 
1. Diffused versus concentrated ownership structure, and the 
consequent links between many or few “nodes” of shareholders with 
the firm and the other stakeholders; 
2. Large versus fragmented creditors; 
3. The link between the (listed) firm, its stock market, and the 
worldwide markets, each representing a node correlated to the 
others; 
4. A reinterpretation of the theory of the firm as a Coasian nexus 
(network) of contracts; 
5. The spread of information among networked stakeholders; 
6. Value creation with digital scalability, where intangible nodes grow 
exponentially, increasing the value of the network; 
7. Value destruction due to (strategic) node deletion; 
8. Interfirm coordination; 
9. Interlocking directorship among board members of different firms; 
10. The impact of network analysis and game theory on interactive 
agents. 
The study is organized as follows: after an introductory paragraph 
about network theory, the main governance points will be synthetically 
analyzed, with emphasis on the open issues that are closer to a 
“networked” interpretation.  
A discussion with indications for future research and some critical 
considerations will precede the concluding remarks. 
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2. NETWORK THEORY 
 
Network theory is the study of graphs as a representation of either 
symmetric relations or asymmetric relations between discrete objects. In 
computer science and network science, network theory is a part of graph 
theory: a network can be defined as a graph in which nodes and/or edges 
have attributes (e.g. names). 
An interdependent network is a system of coupled networks where 
nodes of one or more networks depend on nodes in other networks. Such 
dependencies are enhanced by developments in modern technology. 
Dependencies may lead to cascading failures between the networks and a 
relatively small failure can lead to a catastrophic breakdown of the 
system. Blackouts are a demonstration of the important role played by 
the dependencies between networks.  
Networks represent a fundamental characteristic of complex 
systems whose connected structure may give an innovative 
interpretation of the interactions among (linked) stakeholders. 
Network theory has applications in many disciplines including 
statistical physics, particle physics, computer science, electrical 
engineering, biology, economics, finance, operations research, 
climatology, ecology, and sociology. Applications of network theory 
include logistical networks, the World Wide Web, Internet, gene 
regulatory networks, epidemiology, metabolic networks, social networks, 
epistemological networks, etc. 
The links of a network can be directed or undirected. Some systems 
have directed links, like the www, whose uniform resource locators 
(URL) point from one web document to the other, or phone calls, where 
one person calls the other. Other systems have undirected links, like 
transmission lines on the power grid, on which the electric current can 
flow in both directions. A network is called directed (or digraph) if all its 
links are asymmetric, and cause-effect relationships are only one-way; it 
is called undirected if all its links are symmetric (one-to-one). Some 
networks simultaneously have directed and undirected links.  
Most relationships in corporate governance are bi-directional and so 
undirected. 
A key property of each node is its degree, representing the number 
of links it has to other nodes. The degree is an important parameter even 
in corporate governance, as it identifies the connections among 
stakeholders and their intensity. 
Edges among nodes (i.e., stakeholders) represent (Estrada and 
Knight, 2015): 
 Physical links (pairs of nodes can be physically connected by a 
tangible link); 
 Physical interactions (connection determined by a physical force); 
 Ethereal (intangible) connections (information or other immaterial 
links); 
 Geographic closeness between nodes; 
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 Social connections (friendship, collaboration, family ties, etc.); 
 Functional linking (actions that activate other activities). 
Nodes may not be directly linked by an edge but still have some 
bridging relationships, through a walk (trail) among distinct edges.  
The study of degree distribution is particularly suited to the 
analysis of complex networks (Estrada & Knight, 2015, p. 95). 
Scale-free networks are consistent with corporate governance 
patterns and with the presence of hubs represented by pivoting 
stakeholders (large creditors; managers; key shareholders, etc.). Once the 
hubs are present, they fundamentally change the system’s behavior. 
Networks can be interpreted in both static and dynamic terms that 
represent their evolution and may be used also for predictive purposes. 
Evolving networks can predict the growth rate of a node that may 
depend on its age, and contribute to the interpretation of dynamic 
governance issues. 
Another important concept is represented by internal links. In 
many networks new links not only arrive with new nodes but are added 
between pre-existing nodes. For example, the vast majority of new links 
on the www are internal links, corresponding to newly added URLs 
between pre-existing web documents. Similarly, virtually all new 
social/friendship links form between individuals that already have other 
friends and acquaintances. 
Internal links represent an important feature of the firm that has a 
strong bulk of inside stakeholders that are closely tied among them, with 
further links to other external stakeholders. 
Figure 1 shows how internal and external stakeholders interact 
around the company that represents the pivoting hub. 
 
Figure 1. External vs. internal stakeholders 
 
2.1. Social networks 
 
Social network analysis examines the structure of organizational 
networks and relationships between social entities that can be 
represented by interacting stakeholders.  
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(Social) networks are often used to interpret the behavior of 
communities. The employees of a company are more likely to interact 
with their coworkers than with employees of other companies. 
Consequently, workplaces appear as densely interconnected communities 
within the social network. Communities can be detected with 
hierarchical clustering that is based on a similarity matrix that 
measures the distance between two nodes. Communities can be dense or 
sparse, are typically overlapping and they have communicating and 
clustering links. Communities in social networks tend to be nucleated 
around strong ties that may be represented by hubs. These properties 
have evident governance implications. 
Assortativity or assortative mixing is a preference for a network's 
nodes to attach to others that are similar. Though the specific measure of 
similarity may vary, network theorists often examine assortativity in 
terms of a node's degree. The addition of this characteristic to network 
models approximates the behaviors of many real-world networks. 
Assortative mating reflects the tendency of individuals to date or marry 
individuals that are similar to them. In assortative networks, hubs tend 
to connect to other hubs and small-degree nodes to similar nodes. In a 
network environment, we can also encounter the traditional 
assortativity, when nodes of similar properties link to each other.  
Correlations between nodes of similar degree are often found in the 
mixing patterns of many observable networks. For instance, in social 
networks, nodes tend to be connected with other nodes with similar 
degree values. This tendency is referred to as assortative mixing, or 
assortativity. On the other hand, technological and biological networks 
typically show disassortative mixing, or disassortativity, as high degree 
nodes tend to attach to low degree nodes (Newman, 2002).  
In assortative networks, nodes of comparable degree tend to link to 
each other: small-degree nodes to small-degree nodes and hubs to hubs. 
In neutral networks, nodes link to each other randomly. In disassortative 
networks, hubs tend to connect to small-degree nodes and small-degree 
nodes to hubs.  
Social networks are assortative, and stakeholders typically behave 
accordingly. 
 
Figure 2. Interaction among users of a social network 
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2.2. Clustering networks 
 
Many real-world networks are characterized by the presence of a 
relatively large number of triangles. 
A network formed by triangles joined at a central node (Estrada & 
Knight, 2015, p. 103) can be represented in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. Clustering triangular networks 
 
This representation is consistent with a firm (hub at the center) and 
its stakeholders that can be grouped in converging triangles, each 
representing a category (shareholders, managers, employees, etc.). 
Adjacent triangles may well be linked among them. 
 
3. DIFFUSED OR CONCENTRATED OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE? 
PUBLIC COMPANIES VERSUS FAMILY BUSINESSES 
 
The ownership structure considers two corner solutions where 
shareholders are either diffused (mainly in listed public companies) or 
concentrated in family businesses. The number of the shareholders (each 
representing a node) and the links among them and with other 
stakeholders is fully consistent with network theory. 
Diffused ownership is typical of large corporations that are listed 
and are characterized by a high degree of separation between ownership 
and control: atomized shareholders act like principals that delegate the 
management of the firm to professional agents. 
In family businesses, principals and agents tend to overlap and, in 
many cases, coincide. Internal ties are stronger within the family firm, 
whose dimensions are typically smaller than that of public companies. 
The obsession to keep control under the family often limits growth 
opportunities. 
Diffused ownership in public companies can be interpreted in terms 
of networking links among stakeholders (nodes), without (Figure 4 or 
with Figure 5) the intermediation of institutional investors that often act 
as proxy-collectors, concentrating the voting power and acting as a hub 
linked to otherwise uncorrelated nodes. 
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Figure 4. Networking stakeholders in a public company 
 
Figure 5. Institutional investors (proxyholders) in a public company 
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Family businesses or even public companies may be part of a group 
that can be pyramidal or take the shape of a “comb” and develop 
horizontally. In the former case, there is stock leverage, according to 
which the ultimate shareholders of the holding company minimize the 
equity-holding necessary to control the operating companies. This brings 
to well-known opportunistic behaviors. 
Both structures can evidently be conceived in terms of networks, 
where each firm is the node and shareholdings represent the edge. 
 
Figure 6. Pyramidal group 
 
Figure 7. Horizontal group 
 
Shareholdership is fragmented in family businesses that get 
articulated along generations, for inheritance reasons. Common control 
can be kept through unifying holding companies that are positioned at 
the vertex (hub node) of the group. If the tree ramification of the family 
grows above the holding company, then control over the operative firms 
is preserved. Trees are graphs lacking cycles and they are rooted if they 
have a single vertex (van Steen, 2010; Chapter 5), for instance, 
represented by the holding company. 
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Figure 8. Ascendant generational ramification (preserving the “hub” 
holding company) 
 
Group companies may be represented by articulated networks in 
the case of the interlocking Japanese keiretsu or the Korean chaebol 
(Han, 2016), synthetically recalled in paragraph 8. 
 
4. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE FINANCIAL 
MARKETS 
 
When a firm is listed, its ownership is diffused (see paragraph 3.) and the 
market value of its shares reflects the stock market price. The market 
price of the firm is sensitive to the domestic stock market that hosts the 
firm and the sensitivity parameter is expressed by the beta (β) of the 
listed stock against the volatility of the market. 
But stock markets are also linked among them and so the intrinsic 
volatility of each market is transmitted to other markets through their 
correlation: the higher the correlation, the bigger the risk sharing 
through contagion. 
The interactions between the listed firm and the other firms of the 
same (domestic) market contribute to the overall market volatility. 
Interconnectivity among stock markets brings to overall volatility 
(systemic risk) that cannot be further reduced through international 
diversification. 
These well-known properties can be interpreted in network terms 
that represent the macro-links between the stock exchanges and the 
micro-links within domestic stock markets. Spreading phenomena and 
epidemic modeling of contact networks can explain the propagation of 
risk among different stock markets. 
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Figure 9. International portfolio diversification 
 
5. THE FIRM AS A COASIAN NEXUS (NETWORK) OF 
CONTRACTS 
 
The firm can be considered as a nexus of contracts both internally, so 
justifying in a Coasian way its very existence, and externally, should 
agreements with third parties be considered, within a broader 
framework.  
This interpretation is fully consistent with the network theory since 
nexuses are the links among different nodes (here represented by 
composite stakeholders, in a multilayer framework). 
Consider an initial situation where there is no firm. Each node 
represented by a blue circle can have different links with the others. 
Figure 10 shows an increasingly linked framework where the network (a) 
is initially empty (since there are no links among the different nodes) and 
then becomes increasingly linked with more and more edges (b → c →d). 
 
Figure 10. Network (without a firm) 
 
A different situation occurs when at the center of the “crossroad” 
among the different nodes there is a hub represented by the firm.  
Nodes are increasing. In the situation represented by (e) in Figure 
11, the hub is the only pivoting entity: each stakeholder must pass 
through the hub to communicate with another node; in situation (f) or (g) 
nodes are also (increasingly) linked among them, without necessarily 
passing through the hub. 
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Figure 11. Network with a hub firm 
 
From Figures 10 and 11, it intuitively appears that the hub/firm 
adds value to the whole network. This may be considered a “graph-
theory” interpretation of the theory of the firm. 
Nexuses of contracts are also consistent with supply and value 
chains where stakeholders interact to co-create shared value. Supply 
chains will be examined in par. 12. 
External nexuses of contracts typically involve synergic 
stakeholders, linked to the firm with pass-through contracts or other 
cooperation agreements; while stakeholders always include shareholders, 
they typically go beyond this core character, being also represented by 
debtholders, clients, suppliers, workers, and public authorities, up to the 
civil society surrounding the company and interested in its well-being. 
Vertical integration represents a well-known form of networked 
cooperation, within the “make it or buy” strategic decision that stands 
out as one of the basic elements of the theory of the firm, as illustrated 
by Williamson (1985), Holmstrom and Tirole (1989), and Hart (1995, part 
I). In microeconomics, vertical integration describes a management 
control system where companies within a vertical supply chain are 
controlled by a common owner. The specialization of each firm within the 
vertical value chain allows a synergic combination of products and 
services, cementing upstream buyers with downstream suppliers. 
The value chain is consistent with the networking stakeholders that 
rotate around it. 
The Coasian rationale behind the ontological existence of the firm, 
considered as a nexus of contracts, may tentatively be extended to a 
wider framework, where the firm is analyzed within its broader legal 
“web”; the internal nexus of contracts may so be expanded to consider 
also external legal agreements. The firm is the “glue” that brings 
together many heterogeneous stakeholders. 
The Coasian theory of the firm is linked to transaction economics. 
Ketokivi and Mahoney (2017) make some key questions about the issue: 
“Which components should a manufacturing firm make in-house, which 
should it co-produce, and which should it outsource? Who should sit on 
the firm’s board of directors? What is the right balance between debt and 
equity financing? These questions may appear different on the surface, 
but they are all variations on the same theme: how should a complex 
contractual relationship be governed to avoid waste and to create 
transaction value? Transaction Cost Economics is one of the most 
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established theories to address this fundamental question”. 
The concept of node centrality (Estrada & Knight, 2015, Chapter 
14) is used in the determination of the most important nodes in a 
network, acting as hubs. Their characteristics include the ability to 
communicate directly with other nodes, their closeness to other nodes, 
and their role to act as a communicator between different parts of a 
network. Usefulness – up to indispensability - of central nodes is fully 
consistent with the Coasian nature of the firm as a nexus (network) of 
contracts and ties among composite stakeholders.  
Degree centrality measures the ability of a node to communicate 
directly with others, this being a founding characteristic of the firm. 
Firms also have a closeness centrality, having the shortest path distance 
with other nodes represented by surrounding stakeholders. Furthermore, 
firms are characterized by their betweenness centrality, being a key 
communication node between other pairs of nodes. Closeness to other 
nodes is important even in terms of higher influence. 
Communities in networks (Estrada & Knight, 2015, Chapter 21) 
represent an explanation of the organization of nodes in complex 
networks. Communities are groups of nodes more densely connected 
amongst themselves than with the rest of the nodes of the network. 
Communities may be represented by social networks (see Section 2.1.) 
and may be magnetized by hub-nodes represented by the firm that 
clusters stakeholders with its gravitational centrality. 
The firm is seen as a contract among a multitude of parties 
(Holmstrom & Tirole, 1989) and this vision is consistent with an 
interaction of networked stakeholders. 
 
6. THE SPREAD OF INFORMATION (BIG DATA) AMONG 
NETWORKED STAKEHOLDERS 
 
Communicability accounts for the volume of information transmitted 
from one node to another in a network by using all possible routes (direct 
links, paths, trails, etc.) between them. Shorter linking routes are given 
more weight than longer ones (Estrada & Knight, 2015, Chapter 19). 
Information asymmetries – a key concept in corporate governance 
and a main source of conflicts of interest among stakeholders – arise 
when communicability is interrupted or non-existent and are more 
frequent in directed networks, where information flows are not reciprocal 
between two connected nodes. 
Information asymmetries traditionally arise in a corporate 
governance context where borrowers have better information about their 
creditworthiness than the lending bank. They originate conflicts of 
interest which might seriously prevent an efficient allocation of finance: 
the liquidity allocation problem derives from the fact that although 
money is abundant, it is nevertheless not easy to give it to the right and 
deserving borrowers. Managers, for instance, incorporate informative 
privileges that are discounted with other stakeholders (Myers, Majluf, 
1984), increasing the cost of capital and eventually destroying value. 
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Adverse selection is another typical problem in money lending, and 
it occurs when banks - not knowing who is who - cannot easily 
discriminate between good and risky borrowers, who should deserve 
higher interest rate charges. 
Moral hazard is a classical “take the money and run problem” since 
borrowers might try to abscond with the bank’s money or try not to fully 
engage them in the project for which they have been financed. 
These classical corporate governance problems are well-known in 
traditional banking and they naturally bring to sub-optimal allocation of 
financial resources and to capital rationing problems that frequently 
affect even potentially sound borrowers, if they are not able to 
differentiate themselves from those who bluff.  The theory of signalling 
states that information asymmetry between a firm and outsiders leads 
the former to make certain changes in its capital structure. Ross (1977), 
Myers & Majluf (1984) and John (1987) have shown that under 
asymmetric information, firms may prefer debt to equity financing. 
Information is conveyed through interactive networks and so its 
representation and analysis is fully consistent with network theory. 
The network data that mostly impact on information sharing are 
represented by the world wide web and the Internet. 
While the terms www and internet are often used interchangeably 
in the media, they refer to different systems. the www is an information 
network, whose nodes are documents and links are URLs. In contrast, 
the Internet is an infrastructural network, whose nodes are computers 
called routers and whose links correspond to physical connections, like 
copper and optical cables or wireless links. The degree distribution of 
both networks is well approximated by a power law and so these 
networks are scale-free. In the Internet, a few highly connected hubs 
hold together numerous small nodes. 
Network theory can be linked to big data, especially through digital 
platforms that convey information in real time. Value chains based on 
traditional databases become networked when they are linked to other 
chains through value-adding networks. Value chains networks are more 
resilient and able to cope with risks of failure, enabling alternatives.  
Networked value chains fuelled by big data stand out as the best 
value maximizing option, as illustrated in Figure 12. 
Degree, correlations, clustering, and centrality provide information 
on single nodes, their immediate surroundings, and their position with 
respect to the overall network (Caldarelli & Catanzaro, 2012). These 
features are networked informative nodes. Edging big data correlated to 
nodes disseminate extensive information in real-time. 
The topology of networks, so important for their interpretation, is 
based on computing the edge betweenness that finds the edges through 
which most of the shortest paths pass.  
Websites and the internet can be interpreted in terms of network 
science, being represented by relations among vertices and their 
connecting edges. 
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Figure 12. Network of value chains  
Source: taken from Moro Visconti et al., 2017  
 
Social networks, continuously fuelled by big data collection and 
processing, show the dynamic relationships among social entities 
(persons, groups, etc.). Along the value chain, they particularly develop 
the sharing phase. Big data processing of social network contents is quite 
complicated since the wording is semantically hard to interpret and 
classify. 
 
7. VALUE DESTRUCTION DUE TO (STRATEGIC) NODE 
DELETION 
 
Whenever a node is deleted (see Section 2.3.), the value is destroyed. 
If the node is central, due to its strategic importance, its removal may 
severely impair the firm, up to its possible default. 
Destruction or removal of a node may cause cascading implications 
due to domino effects, especially in bi-directional (undirected) networks 
where links are one-to-one. 
Examples may be given by disappearance of a strategic supplier, 
default of an important client with economic and financial drawbacks 
that can undermine the survival chances of the firm, abandonment of key 
employees and managers (especially in small firms), withdrawal of a big 
creditor (bank), etc. 
The resilience of the firm and its ability to cope with adversities can 
be measured even in terms of capacity to rebuild the network when key 
nodes disappear. 
Node deletion may disrupt the supply (and the value) chain that 
after being broken might be re-arranged substituting disappearing nodes 
or broken links. 
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8. INTERLOCKING DIRECTORSHIP 
 
A keiretsu (系列), literally system, series, a grouping of enterprises, an 
order of succession) is a set of companies with interlocking business 
relationships and shareholdings. It is a type of informal business group. 
The keiretsu maintained dominance over the Japanese economy for the 
second half of the 20th century. 
Interlocking rotates around corporate centrality, a concept with two 
components, a large number of interlocks, plus the degree to which those 
interlocks are with other companies with a large number of interlocks. In 
the past, banks were invariably the most central organizations in the 
corporate network (Domhoff, 2016). 
Interlocking is fully consistent with a networked representation of 
related directors that link different firms. 
 
9. INTERNATIONAL GROUP GOVERNANCE: A NETWORKED 
RATIONALE BEHIND THE MULTINATIONAL FIRM 
 
A multinational corporation is a corporate organization which owns or 
controls the production of goods or services in at least one country other 
than its home country.  
The rationale of multinational enterprises has long been debated 
(Contractor, 2012). 
A graphical representation of the linked firms, typically with a 
holding company located in one country and several subsidiaries located 
elsewhere, is fully consistent with the network theory. 
 
Figure 13. Geographical Network of Firms Belonging to the Same Group 
(with an Italian Holding) 
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10. SOCIAL NETWORKS AND CROWDFUNDING 
 
A social network is a social structure made up of a set of social actors 
(such as individuals or organizations), sets of dyadic ties, and other social 
interactions between actors. The social network perspective provides a 
set of methods for analyzing the structure of whole social entities as well 
as a variety of theories explaining the patterns observed in these 
structures (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). The study of these structures 
uses social network analysis to identify local and global patterns, locate 
influential entities, and examine network dynamics. 
Crowdfunding is the practice of funding a project or venture by 
raising small amounts of money from a large number of people, typically 
via the Internet. 
In crowdfunding, a digital platform is a connecting hub among the 
different equity-holders.  
 
 
11. GAME THEORETIC NETWORKS AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
 
Network game theory is the combination of network analysis and game 
theory to the study of situations of interdependence between adaptive 
agents. Network game theory builds upon and expands classical game 
theory by incorporating the network of connections – the context – within 
which agents make their choices, in so doing it potentially offers a richer 
model of the behavior of agents within games.  
Game theory is the study of mathematical models of strategic 
interaction between rational decision-makers (Aumann, 1987). Game 
types can be: 
a. Cooperative / Non-cooperative 
A game is cooperative if the players are able to form binding 
commitments externally enforced (e.g. through contract law). A game is 
non-cooperative if players cannot form alliances or if all agreements need 
to be self-enforcing (e.g. through credible threats). 
b. Symmetric / Asymmetric  
Asymmetric game is a game where the payoffs for playing a 
particular strategy depend only on the other strategies employed, not on 
who is playing them. If the identities of the players can be changed 
without changing the payoff to the strategies, then a game is symmetric. 
c. Zero-sum / Non-zero-sum  
Zero-sum games are a special case of constant-sum games, in which 
choices by players can neither increase nor decrease the available 
resources. In zero-sum games, the total benefit to all players in the game, 
for every combination of strategies, always adds to zero (more informally, 
a player benefits only at the equal expense of others). 
d. Simultaneous / Sequential  
Simultaneous games are games where both players move 
simultaneously, or if they do not move simultaneously, the later players 
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are unaware of the earlier players' actions (making them effectively 
simultaneous). Sequential games (or dynamic games) are games where 
later players have some knowledge about earlier actions. This need not 
be perfect information about every action of earlier players; it might be 
very little knowledge. 
The link between game and network theories is evident, but even 
the connections with corporate governance can be easily evidenced if the 
patterns of interaction among different stakeholders are carefully 
analyzed. 
Game theory can improve the interpretation of reciprocal and 
contractual governance patterns. 
Game theory applications to finance discriminate between 
uninformed and informed agents, with applications to corporate control, 
capital structure, dividends and stock repurchases, external financing, 
and financial intermediation (Thakor, 1991). Corporate finance 
applications concern also the signaling model, agency costs and other key 
issues (Allen & Morris, 2014) that have strong links with corporate 
governance concerns. 
 
12. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
Stakeholders represent the founding block of corporate governance and 
their intricate interactions can intuitively be represented by networks.  
Some key questions, however, remain largely unexplored, concerning for 
instance, what happens around nodes and their links: 
 Which are the links that represent the firm’s network?  
 Which are the hub nodes? The firm itself, and also key stakeholders, 
etc. 
 How strong are the links among different nodes (stakeholders)? 
 Which are the dynamics that start from the “photography” of the 
network to estimate its dynamic trends? 
These questions contain tips for future investigation and may ignite 
new research avenues. 
Another trendy issue concerns digital platforms that work as 
bridging entities among networking stakeholders who use the platform to 
exchange information. Links among different stakeholders (nodes) 
vehiculate (big) data, reducing information asymmetries and creating 
volatile (risky) economic returns. Physical supply chains, digital 
platforms, and social networks represent interconnected layers to 
exchange data, make transactions and boost value co-creation and 
sharing.   
A scientific methodology often used in network theory is 
represented by induction: what can be shown for small networks may be 
intuitively extended to other networks (Estrada & Knight, 2015, p. 34). 
Linkages among different stakeholders can increasingly follow 
artificial intelligence patterns that are deemed to have deep corporate 
governance implications (Grove & Lockhart, 2019).  
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